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The aviation industry is a large network of agglomerated systems that connects people 
and places. Since the 9/11 attacks, aviation security in the United States has undergone 
tremendous changes and improvements. Nonetheless, threat detection mechanisms 
remain imperfect as seen from hijacking attempts by passengers who have gone 
undetected via security. 
Alternate ways of thinking and looking at security was explored through a system 
perspective. The focus was on passenger security system with the intention of identifying 
potential areas of improvement for aviation security with terrorist using aircraft as a 
weapon. A supply chain approach was taken as the model to move and deliver people as 
goods through security checks to the aircrafts. Together with this approach, the concept 
of risks, uncertainties and the associated risk assessment of potentially defective “goods” 
were examined. 
A systems engineering process was used. Through systematic analysis 
scrutinizing interactions between airport objects and passengers (as objects), this thesis 
pin-points possible gaps, and thereby identify approaches or means to safeguard and 
counter these risks. Analysis included the exploration of the trade space between different 
entities within the system and the interactions between objects, functions, processes, and 
its associated results. 
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The aviation industry is comprised of various systems, agglomerated into a large network 
of systems that connects people and places. Each day, millions of travelers rely heavily 
on this system of systems (SoS) for transportation between domestic and global locations. 
According to the Bureau of Transportation Statistics, an average of about 1.76 million 
domestic passengers boarded domestic flights in the United States in 2012. The 
September 11 hijacking of aircraft in a coordinated terrorist attack in the United States 
was a milestone in the history of aviation security. Since the 9/11 attacks, aviation 
security in United States has undergone tremendous changes with a defense-in-depth 
approach. While improvements have been incorporated into aviation security at airports, 
threat detection mechanisms remain imperfect as seen from the occasional reports of 
hijacking attempts by passengers who have gone undetected via the various layers of 
security. 
Alternate ways of thinking and analyzing security were explored through a system 
perspective. The focus was on passenger security system within the aviation security SoS, 
with the intention of identifying potential areas of improvement for aviation security with 
terrorists using aircraft as a weapon. A supply chain approach was taken to model 
movement and delivery of people as goods through security checks to their respective 
aircrafts. The analogy is for passengers to pass through various phases in the supply 
chain, with each phase being the means of detecting “security defects” in the “goods” 
(i.e., passengers). The purpose is to have a flow of goods through the supply chain in a 
timely fashion with the end state of delivering defect-free passengers with the appropriate 
certification of security at the doorstep of each outbound aircraft. Together with this 
approach, the concept of risks, uncertainties, and the associated risk assessment of 
potentially defective goods as they flow through the supply chain was also examined.  
A systems engineering process premised on problem solving that was iterative, 
recursive, and illative was used. A systematic analysis of the airport passenger security 
system was performed, scrutinizing interactions between airport objects and passengers 
(as objects) to pin-point possible gaps and vulnerabilities that could be potentially 
 xvi 
exploited by malicious parties, and thereby identify approaches, means or even measures 
to safeguard and counter against these risks. The analysis included the exploration of 
trade space between the different entities within the system and the interactions between 
objects, functions, processes, and its associated results. Through the analysis, new 
security measures and processes for improvement were identified. 
 xvii 
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The first reported hijacking of aircraft was traced to 1931 in Peru (Jenkins, n.d.). 
Since then, aircraft have been hijacked for various reasons ranging from hijackers 
seeking asylum to the exchange of prisoners. Over the years, terrorists have 
“revolutionized” the hijacking of commercial aircraft by using aircraft-as-weapons to 
attack targets of interest. Most notably, the simultaneous hijacking of four aircraft by Al-
Qaeda-affiliated extremists on September 11 culminated in a coordinated terrorist attack 
on civilian and government targets in the United States. The magnitude and significance 
of this attack continues to have lasting effects on the global landscape of aviation security 
as well as on behaviors and attitudes worldwide. According to the Government 
Accountability Office (GAO) Report, Department of Homeland Security: Progress made 
and work remaining in implementing Homeland Security missions 10 years after 9/11, 
“in the aftermath of the attacks, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) was created 
with key missions1 that include preventing terrorist attacks from occurring within the 
United States” (GAO, 2011).  
The current aviation security system in the United States is based on a defense-in-
depth approach which implies sequential and layered mechanisms that enact security 
functions to increase freedom from danger or threat. Multi-layered security enacted 
through a sequence of overlapping security mechanisms provides validation and 
verification of performance, as well as time to detect, evaluate and respond to threats. 
The security risks or threats that are being detected by mechanisms are known as security 
defects in the context of this thesis. The detection of defects would save lives and 
minimize damage. Effective detection is based on the principle that the greater the 
distance and time allotted to detection, the higher the probability there is for detecting 
defects. These layers of security mechanisms include intelligence collection and analyses, 
pre-screening of passengers, access control to airport areas, passenger security screening, 
                                                 
1 Aviation security is one of the Functional Mission Area of the DHS. 
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passenger checked baggage screening, cargo screening, and on-flight security. While 
each individual security layer is aimed at a specific threat identified in aviation travel, 
these layers collectively are intended to provide a secure environment in general for 
aviation travel. The majority of these security mechanisms across the various security 
layers is intended to be transparent to an individual bound for air travel as these measures 
are being implemented and performed in the background. A few exceptions to this 
intended transparency are passenger security screening2 and passenger checked baggage 
screening3 which involve a direct interaction with the individual traveling. While 
improvements have been incorporated into aviation security at airports, there are still 
occasional reports of hijacking attempts by individuals who have gone undetected via the 
various layers of security. 
B. THESIS MOTIVATION AND FOCUS 
The objectives of the thesis are to identify different ways of thinking about and 
looking at security and to identify potential areas of improvement for aviation security. 
Particular attention was placed on preventing the use of aircraft as a weapon. The thesis 
focused on the passenger security system within the aviation security system of systems 
(SoS). The research was carried out over a nine-month period and examined the 
interactions between airport objects and passengers (as objects) bound for air travel with 
the purpose of identifying new ways of thinking about security and potential 
improvements to security, in terms of both mechanisms and processes.  
C. PROBLEM DEFINITION 
The aviation industry is comprised of various systems, agglomerated into a large 
network of systems that connects people and places. Each day, millions of travelers rely 
heavily on this SoS for transportation between domestic and global locations. While the 
images and effects of the 9/11 attacks remain vividly in the minds of many travelers, the 
                                                 
2 This comprises both security checks of carry-on baggage and physical inspection of individuals 
bound for air travel. 
3 Direct interaction with individuals occurs when the checked baggage poses problems to security 
personnel during physical inspection. 
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impact of the immediate aftermath on air passenger travel was overcome when air 
passenger travel reached its pre-9/11 peak in July 2004 (Notis, 2005). Since mid-2004, 
the number of travelers has continued to grow. According to the Bureau of Transportation 
Statistics, a total of 642,202,749 passengers (RITA‒BTS, n.d.) boarded domestic flights 
in the United States in 2012. This magnitude of passengers translates into an average of 
about 1.76 million domestic passengers per day distributed across the airports in United 
States.  
Since the 9/11 attacks, aviation security in the United States has undergone 
tremendous changes in security and improvements in passenger safety. With the passage 
of the Aviation and Transportation Security Act, the National Strategy for Aviation 
Security implemented a robust system of detection, protection and interdiction through 20 
layers of security actions in place at more than 450 airports (Pistole, 2011). Amongst the 
various systems and elements within the aviation security system, those involving the 
passenger have a direct impact on the possible use of the aircraft as a weapon to carry out 
an attack, as demonstrated in the 9/11 attacks. While the authorities continue to refine and 
enhance the aviation security SoS, the ability to focus on the passenger security system 
amidst other systems at the airport is of core relevance.  
The problem is the existing threat mechanisms for detecting defects are imperfect. 
Imperfect mechanisms generally require redundancy and sequential implementation. This 
approach of using overlapping mechanisms can be in either the spatial or temporal 
domain, or both. Further, the failure of mechanisms that detect and identify anomalous 
behaviors may allow a breach of security to pass unnoticed without a sufficiency of time 
to recognize the breach with some form of backup mechanism(s). 
Possible alternative solutions include: improving technology; improving 
mechanisms; increasing depth (the number and the distance-time factor that determines 
“depth”) and effectiveness of the mechanisms, and increasing redundancy through 
overlap and adding more mechanisms. Additionally, solutions would include changes or 
additions/deletions to processes (procedures, activities, and acts).  
 4 
D. APPROACH, AND METHODOLOGY  
Airport security currently adopts a risk-based approach toward passenger 
screening (TSA, 2013e), categorizing the majority of passengers to be low risk. The 
limitation of such an approach is the shifting of focus to a smaller group of passengers by 
facilitating faster security clearance for passengers identified and categorized to be of low 
risk. While this seems to be a logical approach from many perspectives, it is susceptible 
to the inaccuracy and quality of the categorization of low risk passengers. To improve the 
detection of would-be-terrorists, the approach taken in this thesis is to view the 
movement of people through the airport to the aircraft as a supply chain, harnessing its 
characteristics of defect detection and continuous monitoring. 
With the intent of adopting different ways of thinking about and looking at 
security, a systems perspective was taken (as opposed to SoS perspective) on the 
passenger security system. Langford (2012) defined a system as “a bounded, stable group 
of objects exhibiting properties that through the interactions and exchange of energy, 
matter, material wealth, and information (EMMI) provide functions.” A system can also 
be understood from Maier and Rechtin (2009) as “a collection of things or elements that, 
working together, produce a result not achievable by the things alone.” Thinking of the 
passenger security system as a “system” implies that a terrorist is part of the passenger 
security system (as a participant), but an externality to the system (as a disruptor). 
Langford (2012) defined an SoS to be “a set of systems that are both integrated and 
interoperable to achieve a set of metasystem functions in which all the component 
systems participate.” Jamshidi (2009) has reviewed several potential definitions of SoS 
and defined SoS as “large-scale integrated systems that are heterogeneous and 
independently operable on their own, but are networked together for a common goal.” 
Thinking of the passenger security system as part of an SoS implies that a terrorist is not 
a part of the “system,” but rather part of another system, i.e., the “terrorist system.” In the 
SoS construct, the passenger security system interacts with the “terrorist system.” 
In the context of this thesis, the passenger security system possessed the 
conditions to be a system when it was able to exercise control over, for example, the 
intelligence data that were being made available and fed from external agencies or 
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databases, otherwise known as other systems, into the system. Similarly, if a passenger 
with security defects was detected and potentially traced or linked to other individuals or 
organizations residing physically outside the airport boundaries or the passenger security 
system boundaries, the passenger security system would then hand over the investigation 
and pursuit of these linkages to the detected defects to other law enforcement agencies 
(i.e., external systems). This behavior is expected from a system as compared to a 
passenger security SoS that would otherwise trigger other SoS elements to follow up. 
This thesis took a systematic analysis of the aviation system with a specific focus 
on the airport passenger security system scrutinizing the passenger (as mereological 
objects) to pin-point possible gaps and vulnerabilities that could be potentially exploited 
by malicious parties, and thereby identify approaches, means or even measures to 
safeguard and counter against these risks. This analysis would include the exploration of 
trade space between the different entities within the system and the interactions between 
objects, functions, processes and its associated results. A systems engineering (SE) 
process premised on problem solving that is iterative, recursive and illative was adopted.   
This thesis adopted the following structure: Chapter I discusses the background 
and basis for the thesis; Chapter II examines the current U.S. aviation security system and 
principles; Chapter III discusses the use of the supply chain as a model to view airport 
passenger security, relating supply chain characteristics to the airport security model and 
analysis; Chapter IV identifies the limitations in existing security systems as problems 
that need to be solved through an SE process involving the use of tools such as functional 
decomposition, functional flow block diagram and evaluative functional analysis. It also 
discusses the conceptualization of improvements (or solutions) to these identified 
problems; Chapter V discusses the development of a risk index (RI) as a form of defect 
assessment within the supply chain; and Chapter VI discusses the improvements to 




The scope of this thesis is to investigate the passage of passengers through airport 
security. The broader scope that involves discussion of boundaries beyond the airport 
physical structures and perimeter are included as part of the movement of passengers 
through the functional and behavioral boundaries of the airport. 
F. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The thesis utilizes the following questions as a guiding tool in laying out the 
content. 
 What are the (new) possible security measures or processes (resulting 
from the analysis of interactions) that airport security authorities could 
possibly consider to help further their view of security?  
 How do the (new) potential measures compare to existing security 
procedures/measures? 
 Can the supply chain model of viewing passengers as goods be used in the 
analysis of the airport passenger security? 
 Can the methodological approach of analysis provide a new perspective 




II. UNITED STATES AVIATION SECURITY SYSTEM 
A. OVERVIEW 
This chapter examines the existing U.S. aviation security system. The current 
aviation security system is based on a defense-in-depth approach which implies 
sequential and layered mechanisms that enact security functions to increase state of being 
free from danger or threat.  
 The principle of sequential mechanisms can be stated as: sequential 
mechanisms provide a higher degree of reciprocity between objects. The 
greater the number of interactions between objects, the higher the 
reciprocity by which objects learn more about each other.  
 The principle of layered mechanisms can be stated as: overlapping 
mechanisms validate the failure of one or more of the overlapped 
mechanism(s). The greater the overlap of the mechanisms, the higher the 
situational awareness.  
In the context of this thesis, the security risks or threats that are being detected by 
mechanisms are also known as security defects. Security defects are defined as anomalies 
in security which may result in a loss of life, material or information. Examples include 
(1) acts or behaviors by individuals which contravene security rules and procedures, (2) 
materials or artifacts that do not conform to security requirements and (3) information 
provided that does not reconcile with security guidelines. The detection of defects would 
save lives and minimize damage; and the greater the distance and time, the higher the 
probability of detecting defects. As depicted in Figure 1, the multi-layered security is 
enacted through a sequence of overlapping security mechanisms that provide validation 
and verification of performance as well as time to detect, evaluate and respond to threats. 
The different phases in the passenger flow from arrival to departure depict the sequential 
mechanisms, while the layered mechanisms arise from the multiple layers of security, for 
example, at the passenger security screening checkpoints consisting of front-line TSA 
checkers, a second layer of supervision and a third layer of oversight coming from the 
command center through the surveillance mechanisms. 
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Figure 1.  Sequential and Layered Mechanisms Enacting Security Functions (Adapted 
from TSA, 2013c). 
1. Definition of Terms 
 Function is defined as “specific or discrete action (or series of actions) that 
is necessary to achieve a given objective; that is, an operation that the 
(security) system must perform…” (Blanchard & Fabrycky, 2011). It can 
also be seen as “an action that is realized when objects interact” 
(Langford, 2012). 
 Sequential is defined as a systematic series of steps, activities or processes 
that objects would flow through in an airport passenger security system. 
 Reciprocity is defined as interactions and exchanges of EMMI between 
objects. 
 Object (airport object or passenger as an object) is defined “as a 
fundamental element, entity, or representation … Objects have boundaries 
and may be comprised of other objects, each of which is related by 
interactions” (Langford, 2012).   
 Interaction is defined “as the transfer of EMMI. Interaction is 
characterized by the transfer of something from one object (sender) to 
another object (receiver)” (Langford, 2012).   
 “Mechanisms are the means by which objects and processes change. The 
effect of a mechanism is to transform an input EMMI into an output 
EMMI. A mechanism is that which operates in the context of force” 
(Langford, 2012).   
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 Overlapped mechanisms provide partial coverage of the same area of 
(security) function, or purpose, serving as back-up to the original function, 
or purpose. 
 Situational awareness is defined as the conscious and knowledge of being 
aware of the activities or occurrence of events within the boundaries of an 
object or entity in context of the airport security system. 
 Validation is “the process of demonstrating the effectiveness of service 
(security) through an assessment of the operational system that exposes 
and quantifies the systems’ limitations” (Langford, 2012).  
 Verification is “the process of confirming the truth or accuracy by 
describing the characteristics of interactions, the enactments of 
mechanisms or procedures, or the consequences of EMMI” (Langford, 
2012). 
 “Performance is the action associated with a (security) function. 
Performance is measured by the extent to which various standards are 
met” (Langford, 2012). 
B. U.S. AVIATION SECURITY MODEL4 
The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) has adopted a layered security 
concept for its transportation system, which includes the aviation system. This concept 
uses multiple layers of security, each serving a different purpose but cumulatively serving 
the common intention of stopping a terrorist attack, as shown in Figure 2 (TSA, 2013c). 
Note: in this thesis, the different layers of security are interpreted as representing 
different roles and implying distinguishable responsibilities. With a combination of 
security layers, the combined security effect is multiplied, creating a more secure aviation 
system. With a total of 20 layers of security in place, the terrorist would need to find gaps 
in each layer and overcome the combined effect of the layers to have any chance of 
carrying out a successful attack. These different layers can be categorized generally by 
type and location of layers. The broad categories are: 1) Intelligence, 2) Security Checks 
and Inspections at airports and 3) Security Measures on board aircraft. 
                                                 




Figure 2.  Twenty Different Layers of Security (Adapted from TSA, 2013c). 
Similar to other security models, intelligence activities form one of the first layers 
in aviation security. Intelligence for aviation security is being fed into the system from 
various information sources within the U.S. intelligence community. These sources 
include agencies such as the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the National 
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Counterterrorism Center (NCC). In addition, this information is regularly supplemented 
by other sources of intelligence supplied to the United States by its Coalition partners, 
and collectively these form the intelligence picture for aviation security. Besides 
providing valuable information for the aviation security system to support proactive 
planning and preparation against potential threats, it also serves as a basis of reference for 
the TSA Secure Flight Program. Under the Secure Flight Program, travelers are required 
to submit additional personal information5 to the airline when they reserve or purchase 
their tickets. The airline in turn submits the information to Secure Flight, which uses it to 
perform watch list matching based on its existing database which is supported by the 
intelligence picture. The aim is to deny individuals identified on the “No Fly List” from 
boarding an aircraft and to identify individuals on the “Selectee List” for additional 
screening before allowing them to board. After the completion of watch list matching, 
Secure Flight then transmits the results back to airlines so they can issue passenger 
boarding passes accordingly (TSA, 2013f). 
Moving from the intelligence layers into the security checks and inspections 
layers, individuals and their belongings could be subjected to a series of scheduled or 
random security checks and inspections at the airport.  
TSA has taken a risk-based approach in its screening procedures based on 
the following premises: (TSA, 2013e). 
 “The majority of airline passengers are low risk. 
 By having passengers voluntarily provide more information about 
themselves, TSA can better segment the population in terms of risk. 
 Behavior detection and interviewing techniques should be strengthened in 
the screening process. 
 TSA must accelerate its effort to optimize screening processes and use of 
technology to gain system-wide efficiencies. 
 Increase security by focusing on unknowns; expedite known and trusted 
travelers.” 
                                                 
5 Known as Secure Flight Passenger Data (SFPD), it includes full name, date of birth, gender and 
redress number (TSA, 2013f). 
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All checked baggage in the United States has been subjected to 100% screening since 
December 2003 under TSA’s Electronic Baggage Screening Program (EBSP) that uses 
Explosive Detection System (EDS) equipment and Explosives Trace Detector (ETD) 
devices as the primary screening technologies to identify potentially hazardous baggage 
(Kane, 2009). All traveling individuals are required to present themselves with the 
appropriate travel documents and personal identification papers to the Travel Document 
Checker (TDC) to commence the scheduled security checks and inspections. At the 
station, the presented documents are checked for authenticity together with the checking 
of passengers’ identities against a valid boarding pass to prevent any fraudulent use by 
any other individual to gain access to the concourse area and subsequently to the aircraft. 
Since October 2011, TSA has also started a pilot program on the use of document 
verification technology, known as Credential Authentication Technology–Boarding Pass 
Scanning Systems (CAT-BPSS) to identify fraudulent identity documents and 
authenticate boarding passes efficiently and effectively (TSA, 2012). Beyond the TDC 
stage, passengers are directed to one of the lines for checks and inspections of carry-on 
bags and personal belongings through X-ray machine checks by TSA officers. Passengers 
are subjected to screening by walking through a metal detector or through Advanced 
Imaging Technology (AIT)6. In addition, a series of security technologies and procedures 
are employed in this stage of scheduled checks and inspection to aid in the identification 
of prohibited items7. This equipment includes bottled liquids scanners to detect potential 
liquid or gel threats, CastScope to ensure that a cast or prosthetic does not contain 
concealed threat, explosive trace detection to screen for traces of explosives, and TSA’s 
3-1-18 for carry-ons. Besides the scheduled checks and inspections, random checks and 
inspections are also conducted at any time from the moment an individual enters the 
airport premises until he/she boards the aircraft. These inspections are carried out by the 
                                                 
6 Imaging technology screening is optional for all passengers. Passengers who do not wish to receive 
imagining technology screening will receive alternative screening, including a physical pat-down (TSA, 
2013, May 21).  
7 The latest TSA Prohibited Items list can be accessed via 
http://www.tsa.gov/sites/default/files/assets/pdf/prohibited_items_brochure_0.pdf 
8 This includes a 3.4 ounce (100ml) bottle or less (by volume); 1 quart-sized, clear plastic, zip-top bag; 
1 bag per passenger placed in screening bin. One-quart bag per person limits the total liquid volume each 
traveler can bring. 3.4 ounce (100ml) container size is a security measure (TSA, 2013, July 3).  
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Visible Intermodal Prevention and Response (VIPR) team to detect and respond to 
potential security threats, explosive detection canine teams, and Screening of Passengers 
by Observation Techniques (SPOT) program. The SPOT program served to observe 
normal passenger characteristics and anxieties and to identify anomalies for detecting 
individuals who may be a security threat to the aviation system (Hawley, 2006). Detected 
threats are subject to additional screening and checks In addition, TSA has also 
implemented the Bomb Appraisal Officers (BAOs) program to prevent explosives and 
IEDs from being introduced into the aviation system and provide on-site assistance to 
resolve suspected alarms. These layers are augmented by a comprehensive network of 
surveillance cameras that provide live images and video coverage on activities within the 
aviation system in support of security. 
The final layers of security are those on board the aircraft. These are aimed at 
safeguarding the flight and its passengers from any threat that was not detected and 
eradicated by the previous layers. These layers comprise of the federal air marshal service 
which places trained air marshals on board a flight. Air marshals provide an added 
measure of security resulting from threat information and intelligence, vulnerabilities and 
consequence9 (Lord, 2009), when the flight is on route to its destination. The federal 
flight deck officers program authorizes eligible flight crewmembers10 to use firearms to 
defend against acts of criminal violence to gain control of an aircraft. Trained flight crew 
assist in handling security incidents that happen on board an aircraft. Moreover, law 
enforcement officers may be on board the flight, hardened cockpit doors may be in place 
to prevent unauthorized access to the flight deck and passengers are at heightened 
awareness should they need to act. 
These different layers of security (i.e., different roles and responsibilities for 
security personnel) constantly evolve and are updated to address emerging threats as a 
result of improvements to existing measures. Associated with these roles and 
responsibilities are changes in security procedures and measures to handle the threats, or 
new approaches and technologies that improve detection capabilities of prohibited items. 
                                                 
9 The exact deployment criteria of air marshals on board flights are not openly available. 
10 A flight crew member may be a pilot, flight engineer or navigator assigned to the flight. 
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An example of these evolving improvements is the numerous screening initiatives11 
introduced by TSA over recent times to align to risk-based security more effectively. The 
various security measures as described in the existing aviation system can be depicted in 
a model of U.S. aviation security, shown in Figure 3. 
 
Figure 3.  U.S. Aviation Security Model (Adapted from Fletcher, 2011). 
 
 
                                                 
11 These include “TSA Pre ✓™ Expedited Screening, Screening for Active Duty U.S. Service 
Members, Screening for Passengers 12 and Under, Screening for Passengers 75 and Older, Managed 
Inclusion.” (TSA, 2013, March 14). 
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The measures in the security model (Figure 3) are as follows: 
 
 Intelligence layers 
 
 Intelligence and Secure Flight program 
 
Security checks and inspection layers 
 
 Visible intermodal prevention and response team, canine teams 
and SPOT program 
 Security checkpoints (travel document checker, walk-through 
metal detector, advanced imaging technology, X-ray screening of 
carry-on bags and personal belongings, bottled liquid scanners, 
CastScope checks, explosive trace detection, Bomb Appraisal 
Officers program) 




 Federal air marshal service, federal flight deck officers program, 
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III. SUPPLY CHAIN MODEL 
This section discusses the use and relevancy of the supply chain model in the 
context of defects detection in airport passenger security system. Bozarth and Handfield 
(2006) defined supply chain as “a network of manufacturers and service providers that 
work together to convert and move goods from the raw materials stage through to the end 
user.” Supply chain management can been seen as a form of SoS architecture with 
different entities interacting at the various levels and phases with the aim of improved 
product, reduced cost and reduced time required to deliver the product. With the aim of 
on time delivery of the required amount of goods to the customer, one of the specific 
features of best value supply chains is the supply chain information systems (Ketchen, 
Rebarick, Hult, and Meyer, 2008). This information system includes the ability to have 
almost real-time monitoring and tracking of goods status, demand and inventory within 
the supply chain. While the supply chain model can serve as a basis to examine and 
possibly reduce costs, and to shorten the time through security, the intent of its use in this 
thesis is to focus on managing risk. The aviation system can be seen as a large supply 
chain composed of a network of service providers in the form of airports transporting and 
moving people to their final destinations. Similarly, airport passenger security can be 
seen as a supply chain model to move and deliver people as goods through security 
checks to their respective aircraft. The analogy is for the people to pass through various 
phases in the supply chain, with each phase being the means of detecting security defects 
in the “goods.” The purpose is to have a flow of goods through the supply chain in a 
timely fashion with the end state of delivering defect-free passengers with the appropriate 
certification of security at the doorstep of each outbound aircraft. As the goods progress 
through the supply chain, testing will be conducted to ensure conformance to security 
requirements. 
A. CHARACTERISTICS OF THE SUPPLY CHAIN MODEL 
The supply chain model can be seen as an integrated process involving different 
entities that transform sourced raw materials into finished products for customers. As 
 18 
defined by Beamon (1998), “a supply chain is comprised of two basic, integrated 
processes: (1) the production planning and inventory control process, and (2) the 
distribution and logistics process, providing the basic framework for the conversion and 
movement of raw materials into final products.” As implied by the definition, integrated 
processes can be seen as one of the key characteristics of a supply chain model. The 
integrated supply chain is the outcome of interactions between the different processes 
supporting the various phases of a supply chain in the production and delivery of the final 
product. In the context of aviation travel, integrated processes exist with different entities 
each having their own procedures and processes, interacting together to support the 
transportation of passengers to their respective destinations. Similarly, within the aviation 
travel system, the airport passenger security system can be seen to possess integrated 
processes working toward providing safe transportation for all passengers.   
Another characteristic of the supply chain model is the use of information and 
communication technology (ICT). Kollberg and Dreyer (2006) considered ICT to be “a 
key enabler for supply chain management through its ability to support information 
sharing and shortening information processing time.” The harnessing of ICT in the 
supply chain can provide instant information, forecasting and replenishment knowledge 
(Lee, 2000), thereby improving situational awareness and facilitating informed decision 
making. This concept of monitoring and tracking goods and the status of the supply chain 
is likewise applicable in the context of the airport passenger security system. The status 
(defective or not defective) and risk profile of each individual passenger can be tracked in 
real-time as he/she flows toward the aircraft, providing up-to-date information to security 
agencies for the type of security measures or procedures to activate. Information and 
knowledge on individual goods, traffic patterns at different airports and at different times 
of the year can further be collated into trends and databases providing valuable 
knowledge for the purpose of goods profiling and subsequent referencing.  
Quality conformance is the other characteristic of the supply chain model that is 
of relevance to the airport passenger security system. Bozarth and Handfield (2006) 
identified “number of defects” and “number of mistakes” as possible measures of quality 
conformance. “A defect or mistake, by definition, means that the product or service failed 
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to meet specifications” (Bozarth & Handfield, 2006). There is a need to understand the 
dimensions of quality that are important to users and incorporate the appropriate 
processes within the supply chain model to meet users’ requirements. In the case of the 
airport passenger security system, the requirement of having defect-free passengers at the 
doorstep of each aircraft drives the processes and measures required to detect defects in 
passengers at any point within the supply chain. 
B. AIRPORT PASSENGER SECURITY MODEL 
The model for integrated security assumes airport passengers participate and can 
be represented as goods in the supply chain. Each physical object in the supply chain is 
identified with a risk index that can change with context and environment. This risk index 
is equivalent to the measure of defects within the notion of goods to be moved. As the 
goods progress through the supply chain toward the end of production, they undergo 
various checks and tests to measure the defect level of the goods as part of the supply 
chain quality control process. Goods that pass the quality control checks will be 
delivered, while goods that do not meet the quality standards (with an RI exceeding the 
defect threshold) would be rejected. Given the growing importance of situational 
awareness, the model focuses on real-time monitoring and tracking characteristics of the 
supply chain to monitor and track defects in the goods so that the movement of people to 
the aircraft can be presented to the crew of the aircraft as defect-free goods. This process 
would include the identification and testing of defects (suspected or identified flaws) in 
the goods across the different phases, as part of the supply chain. An example of such 
real-time tracking and monitoring of passengers once they enter the boundaries of the 
airport system is Project SAMURAI (Suspicious Abnormal Behavior Monitoring Using a 
netwoRk of cAmeras & sensors for sItuational awareness enhancement) (Centre for 
Strategy & Evaluation Services, 2011). Defects measured in the form of an RI that would 
be assigned to every good that is bound for air travel. Depending on the activities, 
interactions and outcomes, the RI would vary as goods flow through the different phases 
of the model. The RI and its changing profile would be tracked and monitored in real-
time over the phases to determine if the final goods to be loaded onto the aircraft are 
within the acceptable defect threshold. 
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While the concept of RI will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter V, at this 
point RI can be broadly categorized as Low, Medium or High. Anyone who boards any 
mode of transportation with an end terminal at the airport would be assigned a low RI. 
Someone who disembarks before reaching the airport would have his/her RI reset and the 
relevant information stored and archived. Depending on the exhibited actions, behavior 
and interactions during the trip or over multiple trips towards the airport, the RI of the 
individual would vary. When the RI exceeded the TEST threshold, the individual would 
be tested through built-in tests along the phases. The RI level can be a reduced, increased 
or maintained RI depending on responses and observations during testing (e.g., 
nervousness, dry mouth) and the outcome of testing. While an unclear act may result in a 
maintained RI, a suspicious act would definitely increase one’s RI. The RI and its profile 
would be tracked and monitored in real time for decision making, which could mean 
going through other testing or even being refused final clearance to board the aircraft.   
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IV. INTEGRATIVE FUNCTIONAL ANALYSIS 
Integrative functional analysis is a method that shows how interactions between 
objects result in functions that help describe the potential uses of an object or system 
(Langford, 2012). This method is premised on a systematic approach to analyzing the 
consequences of interactions between objects that comprise another object, system or 
system of systems. Through the technique of decomposing functions into sub functions, 
the partitioning of objects into modules that comprise single inputs and output, and the 
interactions between modules of each object to be analyzed, this method provides a 
framework to sift through processes and procedures to identify potential areas of 
improvement. 
A. SYSTEM BOUNDARIES 
The airport system comprises many different objects and each of these objects has 
its own set of unique boundaries evolving around how the object would exist on its own 
within the system or interact with other objects as part of the airport system. As part of 
the analysis of the airport system, the study of the system boundaries provides insights 
into the characteristics of the system and an additional dimension of the problem at hand. 
A change in boundary conditions could result in emergence that impacts the entire 
system. For example, allowing the carrying of pocket knives on board a flight (Ahlers, 
2013) would have an impact on overall system operations and the interoperability of all 
constituent systems especially if the change in policy runs contrary to existing state law 
(Durkin, 2013).   
1. Behavioral, Functional and Physical Boundaries 
People bound for air travel will pass through defined boundaries and domains as 
they make their way to departure gates and boarding areas. These boundaries and 
domains are the behavioral, functional and physical aspects of limitations that 
characterize travel to board aircraft.  
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a. Behavioral Boundary 
Generally, transportation lines to the airport are planned and designed to 
terminate at the airport with the airport being either the final destination or starting point 
for the airport system. These lines can be in the form of a road network, railway tracks or 
even pedestrian walkways. People on the various modes of transportation on these lines 
may be bound for all possible destinations that are linked or interconnected to the lines. 
People bound for different destinations with various purposes may behave and act 
differently on each of these transportation lines. The behavioral boundary signifies the 
behavioral perimeter where the airport system functions and objects influence the 
behavior of the individuals who are traveling to the airport. This is the point beyond 
which the behaviors observed of the remaining individuals on the transportation lines 
would be similar to those of all people going to the airport even though they may be 
traveling to the airport for different purposes, such as working at the airport and traveling 
as a passenger. This behavioral boundary also serves as the boundary where the intention 
of all remaining individuals on the transportation lines becomes clear that they are all 
bound for the airport. The context and perspective of the travelers serve to identify 
behavioral boundaries. 
b. Functional Boundary 
Functional boundaries are formed at the interface of objects due to the 
interactions of objects (Langford, 2012). In the airport system, functional boundaries are 
determined by interactions between the objects of transportation that link the airport and 
individuals using them. For individuals with a perspective of going to the airport, any 
embarkation point on the transportation lines (be it a bus stop, a train station or any point 
along the way) signifies the functional boundary of the function of ‘to transport’ as 
signified by “going to the airport.” In essence, the functional boundary of the airport 
system is a function of interactions between objects residing both within and outside the 
system and can change depending on the dynamics of interactions between the objects. 
The traveler’s use or lack of use of the objects associated with and comprising the 
transportation links identify the functional boundaries. 
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c. Physical Boundary 
Physical objects can be thought of as the exterior perimeter of a solid 
object, a network of physical objects, and structures with holes, voids and gaps. The 
structures may be rigid or flexible or small or large (Langford, 2012). In the context of 
the airport system, the domain of “close proximity” signifies the physical perimeter 
boundary of the airport system. The corporeal boundary can also be conveniently 
considered and used as the extended physical boundary of the airport passenger security 
system. 
B. AIRPORT PASSENGER SECURITY SYSTEM AS A SUPPLY CHAIN 
MODEL 
The airport passenger security system can be thought of as the supply chain in a 
manufacturing model; it moves and delivers people (passengers) as goods through 
security checks to the respective flights. The analogy is for the people to pass through 
various phases in the supply chain, with each phase being the means of detecting security 
defects12 in the “goods.” Security errors are defined as mistakes committed by 
individuals intentionally or unintentionally which could potentially result in downstream 
security defects. Defective individuals are defined as individuals who deliberately 
commit a security error or contribute to a security defect. In the airport passenger security 
system, security defects can be associated with passengers or carry-on items or 
belongings, i.e., objects, functions and behaviors. The aim is to have a smooth flow of 
goods through the supply chain in a timely manner with the end state of delivering 
defect-free13 passengers with the appropriate certification of security at the doorstep of 
each outbound aircraft. As the goods progress through the supply chain that is grounded 
in the physical world of objects (i.e., physical locations are used to inventory or inspect 
the progress of goods through a sequence of physical objects; for example, checkpoints, 
can be considered a like-kind equivalent for security at airports), testing will be 
conducted to ensure conformance of security requirements. 
                                                 
12 Refer to Chapter 2 for the definition of security defects. 
13 Defect-free is being equated to having a security RI that is acceptable to the security authorities. 
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1. Passenger Physical Flow in Airport System 
Anyone with the intention of traveling to the airport would need to board one of 
the available transportation lines to make their way to the airport. As the individual 
travels toward the airport, he would enter the behavioral boundaries of the airport system 
as observed through the exhibited behavior of the individual traveling to the airport. The 
interactions between individuals (who are to be or are bound for the airport) with airport 
system functions or other individuals (or objects related to air travel and the particulars 
that distinguish the traveler) would determine the behavioral boundaries of the airport 
system. The interactions between the individual and the functions of the transportation 
lines would determine the entry into the functional boundaries of the airport system as the 
individual travels beyond doubt toward the airport. The crossing of the individual into the 
perimeter boundary of the airport signifies the entry into the physical domain of the 
airport system. This physical flow of the passenger within the airport system is as shown 
in Figure 4 and discussed in the following sub-sections. 
 
Figure 4.  Movement of Passenger through Airport System Boundaries. 
a. F.3.0 Airport Domain 
On entry to the physical domain of the airport system, the individual 
would undergo a typical physical travel14 to the airport departure gates as shown in 
Figure 5. Individuals arriving at the airport domain (airport building) have the option of 
commencing the required travel procedures with the respective airlines. There is a 
                                                 
14 While there could be other passenger flows within the airport domain, for example, individuals 
transiting at the airport undergo a different flow process; the discussion in this section focuses on a typical 
passenger flow in the airport domain 
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presumed expectation by the airport authority and security that passengers who travel to 
the airport domain involve some interest in the functions of the airport. This analysis of 
airport functions will be discussed in greater detail under the decomposition of the airport 
system. 
 
Figure 5.  Typical Passenger Flow within Airport Domain (Object Movement Route). 
(1) F.3.1 Passenger Drop Off. Regardless of the mode of 
transportation used to commute to the airport, all passengers arriving at the airport 
domain would generally commence their movement through the different phases (Figure 
5) from the passenger drop off area. The starting point could be the vehicular drop off 
area by the curbside, the train station platform, or the bus terminal serving shuttles. 
Passengers residing in a hotel within the airport domain may enter the system via other 
connection means such as internal transit system or even by foot.  
(2) F.3.2 Enter Airport Building. From the drop off point(s), 
passengers would enter the confines of the main airport building to start the traveling 
procedures as required by airlines and airport authorities. 
(3) F.3.3 Go to Check-In Point. The confirmation of an 
individual’s intention to board and fly on the scheduled flight could be performed via one 
of the many means available. According to Delta Air Lines, a passenger could possibly 
adopt one of the five different ways15 to check in on any given traveling day (DELTA, 
2013). With different airlines having varying check-in procedures, individuals who have 
checked in online could potentially proceed straight to the next phase of security checks 
upon arriving at the airport, completely bypassing the need to visit any airline counter or 
airport kiosk. Individuals who are checking in at the airport domain would need to 
                                                 
15 The five ways are (1) to check in physically at the airline counter, (2) online check-in, (3) 
Handphone application and eBoarding Pass, (4) physically at airport kiosk and (5) physically at airport 
curbside. 
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process their check-in by physically going to one of the check-in points available within 
the airport domain. 
(4) F.3.4 Go Through Security Checkpoints. Depending on the 
nature of the travel to the airport, travelers going to the airport for different purposes16 
undergo various forms of security screening. A centralized airport passenger security 
screening has been implemented for all traveling individuals to identify the presence of 
security defects. Checking of travel documents, inspection of individuals through the use 
of walk-through detectors, and physical inspection of carry-on items are being conducted 
here. Besides providing a physical demarcation for a security boundary within the airport 
domain, separating the sterile area (commonly known as the concourse area) for security 
screened passengers from the non-sterile area or the common public accessible domain, 
this centralized security screening also serves as a zone of interaction between security 
screeners and the traveling passengers. 
(5) F.3.5 Enter Concourse Area. After passing through 
(“clearing”) security, passengers could move through hallways connecting the concourse 
area or enter the concourse area directly, leading to the access area beyond the security 
checkpoints to their respective departing gates. This sterile area is an out-of-bounds area 
except for all security screened passengers and the relevant support personnel working 
within the area.  
(6) F.3.6 Go to Departure Gates. Within the concourse area are 
the departure gates. The final access points to the respective flights are defined by the 
doorway to the aerobridge connecting the aircraft to the terminal or the doorway to the 
tarmac for boarding directly from tarmac. Current procedures require individuals 
traveling through airports to present certain types of documentation, e.g., boarding passes 
and sometimes photo identification, at the various gates for boarding. As shown in Figure 
6, a typical layout of the above listed parts make up the whole of the airport security and 
its boundary types. 
                                                 
16 Some examples include delivery of goods, individuals working at the airport within the concourse 
area, aircraft cleaners. 
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Figure 6.  Typical Layout of Airport Terminal (“Terminal Guide–Richmond 
International Airport,” n.d.). 
C. DECOMPOSITION OF AIRPORT FUNCTIONS AND PROCESSES 
Decomposition of airport functions and processes entails breaking down the 
airport system into its constituent functional parts to facilitate the analysis of the system 
and the interactions of the objects within the system. 
1. Airport Process Decomposition 
While the airport system exists to serve many different functions within its 
physical boundaries, the focus of this study is on the functions and processes relevant to 
the passengers as stakeholders in the analysis of the airport passenger security system. 
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Figure 7.  Process Decomposition17 of Airport System. 
2. Passenger Process Decomposition 
As each stakeholder has a significantly different perspective of the airport system 
and the system’s requirements (Buede, 2009), each of them will behave, interact and 
response differently within the context of the system based on their effective needs and 
motivation. While there are many stakeholders involved in the airport system, the focus 
                                                 
17 There are other processes under the airport system that are reflected as “…” since they are not be 
the focus of this decomposition. 
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on passengers within the system is predicated on the intent to use the aircraft as a 
weapon. The process flow block diagrams in Figures 8 to 13 depict the typical passenger 
process and the detailed breakdown of its associated processes. 
 
Figure 8.  Typical Passenger Process Flow Block Diagram. 
A typical passenger in the airport system would generally perform the processes 
shown in Figure 8 as part of the airport process flow to get on board a scheduled flight. 
 
Figure 9.  Check-in Process. 
The check-in process can be performed through one of the five possible ways by 
the stakeholder (in this instance, the passenger) and could possibly vary between 















































Figure 10.  Baggage Check-In Process. 
Depending on what the passenger brings along for the flight, he has the ability to 
perform this process of baggage check-in whenever necessary. 
 































































All passengers would be mandated to perform this process to be security screened 
and cleared for boarding on any scheduled flight. 
 
Figure 12.  Go to Boarding Gate Process. 
As shown in Figure 12, security screened passengers would either wait for the 
departure gates to be opened or would proceed directly to board if boarding has already 
commenced when they reached the departure gates. 
Any time during the passenger’s process flow within the airport system, the 
passenger has the option to perform any activities associated with the “Fulfill 
Wants/Needs” process as shown in Figure 13. The sub-processes could be performed by 
the passenger any time between the main functions that he undertakes the moment he 



















































D. INTERACTIONS BETWEEN OBJECTS TO CREATE FUNCTIONS 
Objects within the airport system interact intimately with stakeholders such as the 
passengers since the airport system provides services through its functions and processes, 
and passengers use these services to meet their wants and needs. This section examines 
and discusses the results of some of the core interactions between the objects (and their 
derived functions) within the airport system with the passenger stakeholder. 
1. Process Passenger Check-in (airport kiosk perspective) versus Process 
Check-in (Passenger Perspective) 
The airport kiosk serves as one of the available means for a passenger to check in 
for a scheduled flight. In this instance, the airport kiosk interacts with the passenger to 
provide the function of passenger check-in to fulfill the passenger’s check-in function. 
See Table 1 for the tabulation of the results of the interactions between the objects of 
airport kiosk, passenger and airport building. 
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Table 1.   Results of Interactions between Functions and Processes of Airport Kiosk, 
Passenger and Building. 
Airport System Passenger Building 
Physical 
Object 
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Support kiosk.   Support 
structure. 
 







Arising from the initial analysis of interactions between the objects of airport 
kiosk and passenger, additional interactions are identified that may enhance airport 
security. For example, airport building surfaces can be used as another object to interact 
with a passenger. In this instance, the building support structure provides a means to 
record the shoeprint while the passenger is checking in at the airport kiosk. From the 
interaction between the passenger and an appropriate sensor on the building floor, one 
could record or identify a shoeprint. For example, a hyper-spectral sensor could compare 
bands of equal energy partitioning with a standardized set of observable parameters (e.g., 
pollen, soil composition, material constituents). Multiple spots within the airport system 
could provide opportunities for such interaction with the passenger. Two measurements 
of the passenger’s attributes may provide an exploitable means for security analysis: 
 A passenger’s shoes could be scanned by optical sensors performing a 
hyper-spectral analysis to identify materials and compositions underneath 
the shoes. 
 The passenger’s weight could be captured in database records for 
subsequent reference and matching. 
Applying the methods of physical, functional, and process decomposition within a 
supply chain structure provides an opportunity for capturing additional information 
pertaining to the passenger. This hyper-spectral information (Hammer et al., 1996; 
Hammer et al., 2001) could tell a story of where the passenger had been prior to the 
airport. Measurement of weight and spectral content could be incorporated and designed 
into interaction spots between the passenger and the building floor at strategic locations 
across the paths of passenger flow from the moment the passenger arrives at the airport 
until reaching the boarding gate. While the passenger may not walk or stop over the 
designated interaction spots (e.g., a passenger may choose to check in online instead of at 
the airport kiosk), data could still be collected so long as there are sufficient collection 
points spread across the entire airport system. These data points could provide a profile of 
the passenger as he passes through different phases of the passenger flow (refer to flow as 
depicted in Figure 8) in the airport system. From a single profile of one passenger, 
multiple interactions with the same passenger could result in a pattern of behavior that 
accumulates over different trips, thereby providing a database and records. Similarly, 
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collecting information on all passengers will uncover common patterns of behavior that 
can be used for the identification of behavioral anomalies in passengers. Security would 
now be able to better assess and profile a particular passenger based on the possible 
places that he could have been to or on the particular activity that he could be involved 
with prior to traveling to the airport. In a like manner, the weight information captured, 
when matched against existing records of the passenger(s), could also shed some light on 
the passenger since the last time he traveled. Any drastic fluctuation of passenger weight 
as he flows through the airport system toward the departure gate could possibly signify 
that he may be carrying additional weight on his body, something that might be worth 
verifying by security. 
2. Process Baggage Check-in (Airline Counter Perspective) versus  
Check-in Baggage (Passenger Perspective) 
Passengers on domestic flights commuting for business purposes or short trips 
would likely be traveling light with only hand-held baggage compared to other 
passengers traveling for vacation, relocation and extended visits on both domestic and 
international flights. Such passengers are likely to have check-in baggage. For each of the 
available passenger check-in options, there are corresponding baggage check-in options 
(James, n.d.) to support passengers traveling with baggage that needs to be checked in. In 
one of these options, the airline counter interacts with the passenger to provide the 
function of processing baggage check-in.  
The decomposition of the baggage check-in process and the results of interactions 
between the objects of airline counter system18 and the passenger based on a typical case 
for a passenger processing check-in baggage are shown in Table 2. 
  
                                                 
18 The different objects at the airline counters supporting the baggage check-in function and associated 
processes. 
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Table 2.   Results of Interactions between Functions and Processes of Airline Counter 
System and Passenger. 
Airport System Passenger 








Results of Interactions 
  Walk up to airline counter.  
A2.1 Weighing 
Scale 
Support check-in baggage. Place check-in bag on 
weighing scale. 
 
Measure weight of individual bag. 




Check ID and travel documents and 
process check-in baggage. 
Present ID and travel 
documents. 








Check weight of check-in bag 




Remove bag label(s) from printer. 
Peel bag label(s) and affix on 
bag(s). 
Transfer baggage onto baggage 
conveyor belt (part of baggage 
handling system). 
Starts baggage conveyor belt to 
move check-in baggage for 
screening, processing and loading. 
Remove labeled odd-size 
baggage19 for separate 
check-in. 
Give claim check for baggage to 
passenger. 
Check number of pieces of 
check-in baggage against 
number of claim check for 
baggage. 
Return ID and travel documents. Keep ID and travel 
documents. 
A2.5 Bag label(s) Provide identification details 
(destination, reference number) for 
baggage. 
-  
A2.6 Claim check 
for baggage 
Provide copy of identification 
details for baggage. 





Move check-in baggage for 
screening, processing and loading. 
-  
  Leave airline counter.  
                                                 
19 Depending on the specific airport procedures, passengers may be required to bring the labeled odd 
size baggage from the airline counter to a separate the TSA counter accepting and processing odd size 
check-in baggage. 
 38 
From the analysis of the interactions between the objects of the airline counter 
system and the passenger, it can be seen that the airline ground crew is the key object 
providing the interface for the baggage check-in processes. The assumption taken in the 
airline counter system is that the airline ground crew handling a particular baggage 
check-in process is a reliable person who has passed some form of personnel screening 
(Morrison, 2002) as part of the employment process and is trusted to perform the 
processes without undermining baggage security. In the design of the EBSP layer of 
security measures, trusting the airline ground crew to handle check-in baggage processes 
without undermining baggage security is further backed up by the 100% screening of all 
check-in baggage to identify any baggage that could potentially compromise security. 
Similarly, in the case of a passenger self-help baggage check-in at the airport kiosk, any 
act by the passenger to tamper with the check-in baggage20 would likewise be discovered 
by the EBSP. Nevertheless, this screening of check-in baggage could only be as effective 
as the individuals operating and running the system. This provides a potential area where 
airport security could exploit the existing monitoring system on the EBSP to extend the 
coverage to include monitoring of activities around and within the EBSP.  
3. Screen Passenger (Security Checkpoint Perspective) versus Clear 
Security (Passenger Perspective) 
The passenger security screening system itself is an SoS composed of the X-ray 
system (A3.1) and its associated objects, the metal detector system (A3.2) and its 
associated objects together with the human system in the form of the checkpoint security 
officer (A3.3). Collectively, these systems and objects interact with the passenger based 
on the defined security processes to provide the function of screening passengers and 
certifying them for entry into the concourse area and eventually to board the scheduled 
flight. The decomposition of the clear security process and the resulting interactions are 
shown in Table 3. 
  
                                                 
20 This includes odd-size baggage that is checked-in separately. 
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Table 3.   Results of Interactions between Functions and Processes of Passenger 
Security Screening System and Passenger. 
Airport System Passenger 




1.2.2.3 Screen Passenger. 2.4 Clear Security 
Process 
P1.0 Passenger 






Results of Interactions – between X-ray system and Passenger 
A3.3 Checkpoint 
security officer 
Control, direct flow and 
instruct passengers to 
different screening station 
lines. 




entering the screening 
system. 
A3.1.1 Table Support items (trays, 
carry-on, belongings. 
Put belongings on table. 
A3.1.2 Tray Hold carry-on and 
belongings. 
Pick up tray. 
Put carry-on in tray. 
A3.1.3 Conveyor 
system 
Support tray(s). Put tray with carry-on 
on conveyor belt. Present tray(s) to X-ray 
machine at a particular 
rate of flow. 
A3.1.2 Tray Hold carry-on and 
belongings. 
Pick up another tray. 
Remove belongings and 
put them in tray. 
Remove electronic items 
from bags and put them 
in tray. 
Remove water bottle, 
food container, 3-1-1 
carry-on from bag(s) 
and put them in tray. 
Empty pockets, remove 
belt and shoes, and put 
them in tray. 
  
                                                 
21 This refers to the point after the passenger has cleared the DTC checks and is next in the line to 




Switch on conveyor 
system. 
Put tray with belongings 
on conveyor belt. 
 
Move conveyor belt 
forward. 
Proceed to go through 
metal detector screening 
(see interactions with 
metal detector system). 
A3.1.5 X-ray 
machine 
Reproduce image(s) of 
items in tray(s). 




Display received image. 
A3.1.4 X-ray 
operator 
Assess and evaluate 
image on display unit. 
Stop, reverse conveyor 
belt if necessary. 
Request assistance for 
additional physical 




Identify and ask owner of 
suspicious item(s) to step 
aside for additional 
check(s). 
Acknowledge as owner 
of bag(s). 
Request owner to open up 
bag(s) containing 
suspicious item(s). 
Assist and open up 
bag(s). 




item(s) for additional 
check(s). 
Conduct test (if 
necessary) on suspicious 
item(s). 
Keep checked item(s). 
Transfer tray(s) from end 
to start of conveyor 
system. 
Take carry-on off 
tray(s). 
  Keep belongings from 
tray(s). 
  Take belt, shoes and 
wear them. 
  Return tray(s). 
  Exit security 
checkpoint. 
A3.4 Queue post 
and lines 
To separate and 
demarcate lines and the 
different screening 
stations. 
Stay within lines.  
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Trigger and direct 
passengers to come 
through metal detector. 
Wait for turn to go 





Transmit signal to test for 
metallic object(s.) 
Walk through metal 
detector. 
Receive reflected signal. 
Analyze reflected signal. 






Observe passenger as they 
go through metal detector 




Support passenger. Step aside for additional 






Check, assess and 
evaluate offending 
item(s). 
Remove item(s) that 
triggered alarm. 
Perform hand-held scan 
on passenger. 




Trigger alarm if metal is 
detected. 
Wait for additional 
check(s) to be 
completed. 
  Go through metal 
detector again if 
necessary. 
 
Analysis of the interactions between X-ray system and the passenger revealed a 
trade space between the elements of the X-ray technology, the competency of X-ray 
operator, the rate at which trays flow through the system and the processes governing the 
screening of carry-on baggage and belongings. From the function of presenting trays 
loaded with carry-on baggage and belongings by the conveyor belt to the X-ray machine 
for assessment, there is a possibility to speed up and improve the performance of security 
by means of resolving any bottleneck caused by the X-ray machine process. Similar to a 
supply chain, the bottleneck determines the throughput of the supply chain. This 
throughput is directly dependent on the number of trays waiting in the line (conveyor 
belt) to undergo security screening and the rate at which each of these trays clears 
screening. In an X-ray system, the conveyor belt is usually not fully optimized with trays 
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lined up back to back. By providing more trays, passengers could potentially get ready 
well ahead of reaching the screening point, removing all carry-ons and belongings and 
putting these items into the trays. Compared to a bottleneck in a supply chain, when 
passengers remove their carry-on baggage and belongings right in front of the X-ray 
machine, the conveyor belt often runs without trays briefly. The speed at which trays 
clear screening is dependent on the X-ray technology and the corresponding flow rate 
associated with the conveyor belt, as well as the defect assessment competency of the X-
ray operator(s) in keeping up with the flow.  
While there are means to improve these elements, they are fundamentally 
dependent on the rule set as defined by the TSA screening guidelines. This set of security 
rules defined by the TSA has a causal effect on the passenger flow rate through the 
passenger security screening system and the total amount of time each passenger spends 
at the security checkpoint22. This defined rule set also provides the basis for the 
identification of known defects that the passenger security screening system is designed 
to undertake. Depending on the complexity of each rule, there is a function relating to the 
amount of time required for that rule to be checked off passengers going through the 
passenger security screening system. In additional to the rule set, there is a corresponding 
consequence on time spent at the security checkpoint as a result of known defects arising 
from the violation or ignorance of the rule set on the part of the first-time or non-frequent 
flyers who may not be familiar with the requirements. 
The configuration of the security checkpoint in terms of the number of checking 
stations and lines and the number of security officers manning each of these offers a trade 
space for the throughput of the passenger security screening system. Given the same 
number of deployed security officers, there are two possible models of configuration. A 
configuration in which resources are spread out to maximize the possible number of 
checking stations and lines versus one with fewer stations and lines but with each being 
more optimally staffed. In the model of spreading out available security officers to 
                                                 
22 A passenger whose carry-on and belongings have undergone x-ray screening and have personally 
gone through the metal detector may still need to spend time to resolve any alarm triggered by suspicious 
item(s), thereby increasing his time at the security checkpoint. 
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achieve the maximum number of security stations and lines, there would likely be 
stoppages in the flow of passengers in the passenger security screening system when 
suspected known defects are being stopped for assessment and evaluation by the security 
officer manning the station and line. While a fewer stations and lines configuration’s 
defect assessing capability at any time is lower, it could potentially minimize stoppages 
in the flow of passengers through the system even in the presence of suspected defective 
passengers. Security officers who are not deployed to man the additional stations and 
lines could be redeployed to augment the remaining stations and lines by handling and 
resolving all potentially defective cases. These defective passengers could be “pulled” out 
of the line for separate assessment and evaluation by the redeployed officers while the 
continuous flow of passengers through the system continues undisrupted.  
Observing and analyzing each and every passenger to identify potential defects23 
as they flow through the system provides another trade space for consideration. A 
centralized airport passenger security screening model only supports the observation and 
analysis of passenger behavioral traits with a broad common baseline that all of them are 
passengers scheduled for an upcoming flight. Decentralizing this security screening 
through relocating and deferring the security checkpoints to the respective departure 
gates or groups of departure gates would provide a more defined and narrowly scoped 
baseline in terms of having to observe and analyze behavioral traits and activities of 
passengers who are scheduled to be on the same flight. Chances are, passengers traveling 
on the same flight to the same destination may exhibit commonalities in behavioral traits 
associated with the particular flight or destination, thereby providing a more distinct basis 
for the identification of anomalous behavior compared to a more generic basis. In 
addition, pushing out the security checkpoints and screening to the departure gates also 
has other benefits. It would minimize the existing security requirements placed on all 
other non-passengers within the concourse area. In this configuration there is no longer a 
need to maintain a sterile area to match the security certified passengers after they clear 
the security checkpoint and enter the concourse area. With the security checkpoints at the 
                                                 
23 These are not known defects as defined and listed by the TSA rule set but are rather behavioral 
aspects of individuals that could provide the slightest of indication that the passengers could be defective. 
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respective gates, the available time and space between clearing security checkpoints and 
boarding the flight at the respective gates reduces the set space for any possible change of 
passenger status to defective. There would be less opportunity for any passengers with a 
malicious intent to act and behave in a manner that would result in defects from the time 
they clear the relocated security checkpoint until they board the schedule flight. While 
this improves aviation security with terrorist using aircraft as a weapon, it can potentially 
open up and present other security risks to the airport operations or infrastructure now 
that security screenings are being pushed forward to the respective gates. 
It can also be seen from the analysis of the interactions that a data capturing 
opportunity rests at the point before the start of the passenger security screening system. 
Passengers can scan their boarding pass to register the time of security screening before 
sending their carry-ons and belongings on tray(s) to the X-ray system. The ensuing 
results of the security screening or any subsequent details could be tagged to the records 
and data of the individual passenger. Similarly, the X-ray images could also be time 
stamped and tagged to the respective passenger. Besides providing useful information as 
part of real-time monitoring and tracking, this information collected over multiple travels 
of the same passenger could provide a reference profile for security exploitation and 
could come in useful during investigation. Any additional verification conducted on 
suspicious item(s) should also be time stamped and tagged to the respective passenger’s 
records and data. The walk-through metal detector could also serve as one of the 
designated interaction spots for the collection of weight and hyper-spectral information 
pertaining to the passenger. 
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4. Surveillance of Airport Environment and Surrounding (Surveillance 
Camera Perspective) versus Fulfill Wants/Needs (Passenger 
Perspective) 
 
Table 4.   Results of Interactions between Functions and Processes of CCTV 
Surveillance System and Passenger. 
Airport System Passenger 




1.2.2.4 Surveillance of airport 
environment and surrounding 
2.7.2 Fulfill Wants/ Needs 
(Shop) 
P1.0 Passenger 




Capture footages within field 




Enter field of view of a 
specific surveillance camera. 
 
Walk around to browse 
merchandise. 
 
Pick up merchandise from 
display units to see, feel, 
"play" with item. 
 
Put merchandise back down 
on display units. 
 
Speak to a sales person to 
find out more about specific 
merchandise. 
 
Pick up shopping basket, 
push cart. 
 
Remove merchandize from 
display unit and put in 
shopping basket or push cart. 
 
Exit field of view of existing 
surveillance camera to enter 
sector (FOV) monitored by 
another surveillance camera. 
 
Leave shop to enter common 
airport domain. 
 
Streaming of LIVE footage 





Receive incoming footage 




Record and store streamed 





Select specific footage to be 
displayed, monitor and 





Select specific footage as 
requested by operator and pipe 
it to display monitor(s). 
A4.5 Display 
Monitor(s) 
Display live streamed footage 





Select a specific segment of 
footage from a specific 
surveillance camera to be play 





Process play back request to 
connect to Video Storage 
System to retrieve footage. 
A4.5 Display 
Monitor(s) 
Display retrieved footage from 
Video Storage System in play 




From the analysis of the interactions between the CCTV surveillance system and 
the passenger, it can be seen that there is an avenue to monitor and track the passenger, 
his activities and interactions continuously from the moment he enters the airport system 
boundaries, which are being constantly surveyed by security sensors and surveillance 
cameras. His progress through the different phases as he approaches the departure gates 
could be tracked through a suite of surveillance cameras within the airport system 
providing coverage of his physical progression within the system. The coverage on a 
particular passenger captured by the various surveillance cameras could be stitched 
together to provide a pattern on the passenger’s behavior, interactions and activities that 
he had undertaken across the different phases. Thus, a profile could be assembled and 
used for security assessment. Coupled with video analytics capabilities, this assembled 
footage could then be assessed and analyzed for anomalies that would otherwise be 
flagged for additional security verification. 
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V. INTEGRATED RISK MANAGEMENT 
The concept of risks, uncertainties and the associated risk assessment of 
potentially defective goods as they flow through the supply chain are discussed in this 
chapter.  
A. OVERVIEW 
Risk is a structural property of the interactions between objects (Langford, 2012), 
an important result from interactions and processes within a system or SoS. Risk 
assessment and analysis form an integral part of the analysis of the airport passenger 
security system, providing context to the uncertainties and risks associated with the goods 
as they flow through the supply chain. There are two commonly implemented approaches 
to risk assessment based on the perspective of risk, either as a structure of objects 
(methodology) or as a process. Within the methodology-based perspective of risk, risk 
assessment can be temporal- or event-based depending on the set of pre-identified 
conditions; for example, risk assessments could be performed as part of a procedure when 
a specific event (such as foiled terrorist attempt) occurs. Process-based risk assessment 
occurs in the context of decision making (Langford, 2012). Additionally, a third approach 
to risk assessment is used in systems thinking. That is, risk is viewed as a consequence of 
actions and interactions between objects and processes (nexus). This approach is used in 
conjunction with structural objects and processes resulting in a system and an SoS 
perspective, combined (Langford, 2013).  
 The SoS view promotes separation of the systems, implying a process-
based approach. In the SoS view the objective is interoperability with high 
coupling and high cohesion. 
 The systems view promotes integration of the systems at a meta-systems 
level, implying objects. In the systems view, the objective is 
interoperability with low coupling and low cohesion. 
B. RISK INDEX (RI) 
There are many ways to qualify risk assessment, and one of them is in the form of 
a risk index. From an SoS perspective, different systems making up the system would 
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each have an RI that is additive in nature for the system compared to the system 
perspective of having a multiplicative RI. In the context of the airport passenger security 
system, the discussion on RI in the following segments focuses on the system 
perspective, assuming that the existing security system is a perfect one without any flaws 
(i.e., all entities and processes function as they were designed and intended).  
1. Risk Index of Passenger Flow in Supply Chain 
The concept of the RI in the passenger flow within the supply chain is that every 
passenger bound for air travel possesses a certain RI that would be computed as part of 
the risk assessment of the passenger as he/she flows through the various phases of the 
supply chain. According to the risk-based approach taken by TSA at all U.S. airports, the 
majority of passengers is deemed to be of low risk (TSA, 2013, March 14) and this 
translates to a low initial RI that is assigned to all passengers. In the flow toward the 
aircraft, the RI increases24 as the passenger physically passes through each phase of the 
supply chain and progresses nearer to the aircraft, thereby increasing the assessed risk 
associated with the passenger on board the aircraft.  
a. Risk Assessment Scenario 
An individual (known as Andrew25) with a hand-held sized bag boarded a 
train traveling in the direction toward the airport at one of the stations along the 
transportation line. Like all other commuters on board the train, Andrew was assigned an 
initial (low) RI so as to initiate the tracking and monitoring of the individual’s risk index. 
Andrew behaved like other commuters, settling in a seat. While his boarding location and 
direction were known, his intentions and final destination were unknown as he could 
potentially disembark at any station along the way. At one of the other stations, another 
individual (known as Billy) boarded the train with a hand-held sized bag and two check-
in sized bags. Billy found a seat beside Andrew and sat down. Like Andrew, Billy was 
                                                 
24 The assumptions taken in this increasing RI approach is that all passengers possess some form of 
risk and the fact that they have progress nearer to the aircraft would translate into a higher risk for the 
aircraft.  
25 For the purpose of ease of reference, arbitrary names have been given to individual passengers in 
the scenario. 
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also assigned a low RI except that his intentions and final destination were clearer 
compared to Andrew; Billy seemed bound for the airport. Andrew and Billy did not talk 
to each other throughout the journey. Andrew’s final destination became clear as the train 
pulled out of the last station before the airport. With him on board the train which 
terminated at the airport, he would be exiting with all remaining commuters bound for the 
airport. As the train pulled into the airport perimeter, Andrew stood up and picked up one 
of Billy’s check-in bags and went to the door, waiting for the train to stop at the airport. 
At the terminating station, both Andrew and Billy left in different directions, each with a 
hand-held bag and a check-in sized bag. Andrew has clearly taken one of Billy’s check-in 
bags along with him.  
At the airport, Billy went straight to a “Food & Beverage” counter, 
grabbed a coffee and sat down while Andrew visited the restroom. Thereafter, Andrew 
used one of the airport kiosks to process his check-in. He answered “Yes” to one of the 
system assigned questions asking if he had packed his check-in bag himself. In another 
question, he answered “No” when asked if his bag had ever left his possession. When 
Billy checked in at the airline counter, he gave similar answers to the same set of 
questions. In addition, he answered “No” when quizzed if he was traveling with someone 
else and if he knew anyone on board the same flight. Thereafter, both proceeded 
separately to the passenger security screening checkpoint to gain access into the 
concourse area. After verifying the authenticity of their travel documents and boarding 
pass details at the document checking station, the document checker arbitrarily waved 
them to separate security checks and inspection lines. Both Andrew and Billy were 
scheduled for the same outbound flight and have seats diagonally across the aisle. Like 
all other passengers, Andrew whisked through the physical inspections via X-ray 
machines and metal detectors without triggering any security violations.  Although Billy 
had lots of sharp office materials such as geometry sets, t-pins and letter openers, he too 
was waved through the security checkpoint as none of them were items on the TSA’s 
prohibited items that could not be brought onto airplanes in carry-on baggage (TSA, 
2013, June 11). In the concourse area, Andrew met up with Charles who had earlier 
cleared the security though he was stopped briefly for having a couple of screwdrivers 
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and scissors26 in his carry-on bag that were within TSA allowable limits. Charles was 
slated to be seated beside Billy. David was seated at the gate area waiting for boarding. 
Earlier, he had his set of pocketknives surrendered at the security checkpoint while his set 
of knitting needles was allowed through (TSA, 2013, January 21). 
b. Risk Index Discussion 
This section focuses on the risk index allocated to an individual passenger 
and how it would change as a result of interactions and flow toward the aircraft, a 
mechanism for risk assessment of passengers. 
(1) Airport Boundary Phase:  
In the physical movement of a passenger in the airport system as 
shown in Figure 4, the passenger enters the airport boundary well before reaching the 
airport domain. The goal in this phase is to identify behavior or activities by individual 
commuters on board the train that would not be normally observed and differentiate them 
from the usual observations of train commuters. Once within the behavioral and 
functional boundaries of the airport, the focus switches to behavior or activities 
associated with commuters traveling to the airport now that it is confirmed that all 
remaining commuters on board are destined for the airport. The review of surveillance 
footage for the April 15 Boston Marathon bombings showed that the suspects “acted 
differently than everyone else. When the bombs blow up, when most people are running 
away and victims were lying on the ground, the two suspects walk away pretty casually" 
(Smith & Patterson, 2013).  
Similar to the Boston suspects, individuals with suspected defects 
would likely act or behave differently from the rest of the normal passengers. Both 
Andrew and Billy were assigned an initial RI like all other commuters on board the train. 
During the journey on board the train, they did not exhibit any behavior that would have 
singled them out from the other commuters. As the train pulled into the airport station, 
however, Andrew took a check-in bag brought on board by Billy. That was an unusual 
                                                 
26 Screwdriver less than seven inches and scissors less than four inches are allowed to be carried on 
board all flights (TSA, 2013, June 11).   
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event within the behavioral boundary of the airport, and it increased Andrew’s RI to a 
level that warrants some attention from the security authorities. Similarly, Billy allowed 
this bag to be taken off the train by someone with whom he did not speak throughout the 
journey; this was not a normally observed act and it also increased his RI. 
(2) Airport Domain and Check-in: Within the airport domain, 
tests and checks would be conducted to verify the presence of defects. Generally, there 
are two types of tests, Type 1 and Type 2. Type 1 tests are defined as being conducted to 
verify suspicion based on knowledge and information about passengers, while Type 2 
tests are conducted to identify or detect new or known defects. The increased RIs of both 
Andrew and Billy as a result of their actions on board the train were indicative of the 
presence of potential flaws in the goods along the supply chain. Once the RI exceeded the 
pre-defined additional testing27 threshold, suspected flaws would be tested for 
deficiencies. The goods would be subjected to a series of Type 1 tests, and depending on 
the outcome of these tests and checks, the RIs could increase, decrease or remain the 
same. Besides the outcome of tests and checks, RI could also be affected by other 
sightings of indifferent behavior and activities that continued to be monitored and tracked 
during the phase. Type 2 tests and checks are also conducted arbitrarily in this phase to 
identify or detect defects. Tests and checks could be incorporated as part of the 
mainstream supply chain process flow within the phase, such as a static built-in test in the 
form of questions and answers during check-in at airport kiosks or over the airline 
counters. Alternatively, tests and checks could be triggered dynamically whenever 
necessary and could be in support of both types of testing. Tests and checks could be 
activated anytime along the entire supply chain to verify the presence of defects or 
identify new or known defects within the goods. This could be in the form of interactions 
between security personnel and the respective passenger within the domain, be it standing 
in the line or moving around. These could entail simple conversational questions, such as 
asking where are the passengers traveling to, where did they buy their nice luggage, etc., 
and observing their responses including factual replies and non-verbal cues.  
                                                 
27 These are tests conducted in addition to those done at the security checkpoints. 
 52 
While facial expression can provide meaningful insights into what a 
person is thinking and feeling, individuals can possibly put on a false face 
when they are lying, conniving, or trying to influence the perception of 
others through false smiles, fake tears, or deceiving looks. Observers 
would have to be mindful that these signals can be faked, so the best 
evidence of true sentiment is derived from clusters of behaviors, including 
facial and body cues, that buttress or complement each other. By assessing 
facial behaviors in context and comparing them to other nonverbal 
behaviors, one can use them to help reveal what the brain is processing, 
feeling, and/or intending (Navarro, 2008).  
In this instance, Andrew’s RI has further increased as his check-in reply did not match 
the activities that happened earlier on board the train; clearly he had lied. While Billy had 
not lied about his luggage, his RI had also increased by virtue of the fact that he is nearer 
to the aircraft. With each test being used as a basis to determine the RI of the individual 
of concern, tests and checks could be conducted throughout the remaining phases until 
such a point where the RI goes down to an acceptable risk index region or when the result 
of a particular test clearly indicates the presence of defects in the form of security 
violations that warrant the goods be removed from the product process and out of the 
supply chain (i.e., ban or stop from boarding the scheduled flight through arrests or 
assistance in further investigations). 
(3) Security Checkpoints: In this phase, passengers are checked 
and inspected against known defects, such as having the matching (passenger matches the 
ID that was presented) travel documents (including passport/government issued ID, valid 
boarding pass, etc. that are authentic); passenger and respective carry-on bags being x-
rayed and inspected for the presence of TSA prohibited items. These are generally Type 2 
tests aimed at detecting known defects though they could be used to supplement Type 1 
testing in certain scenarios. The outcomes of these tests and checks for known defects 
would be conclusive with either a pass or a failure. Any inconclusive outcome would be 
tested repeatedly until a conclusion is made. The assumptions taken in this phase would 
be that all security checks and tests administered are effective and competent in the 
detection and identification of known security defects or observations. At the end of the 
phase, all individuals passing the security tests and checks against known defects would 
have their RI increased given that everyone have progressed nearer to the aircraft. 
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However, an individual’s RI would increase more if the security tests and checks fail. 
These variations of the RI would be based on one of the following possible outcomes.  
 Passed through security checkpoint without any security defect or 
observation. Passenger clears and passes through the checks without the 
detection of any prohibited item. RI would be maintained since most 
passengers were assumed to enter the phase with a low RI, so not having 
any security violation would maintain that low RI. There would be no 
unintentional reduction of RI of a suspected passenger because no new 
defects were identified in this phase as opposed to the observations of his 
behavior and activities that were dubious in the earlier phases. However, 
the cumulative effect on the RI is such that it would increase at the end of 
the phase as passenger moved nearer to the aircraft. 
 Stopped at security checks with security defect(s) or observation. 
Passenger subsequently clears and passes through with the rectification of 
the defect or observation, possibly through the removal of the offending 
item(s) (i.e., thrown away or confiscated). With the rectification of the 
defect, the RI would be maintained though the type and nature of the 
security observations would be noted for subsequent reference. Similarly, 
the cumulative effect at the end of the phase constitutes an increased RI. 
 Stopped at security checks with security defect(s) or observation. 
Passenger physically arrested and removed from flight with the offending 
item(s) being detained. RI would increase beyond the defect threshold 
following the arrest. Type and nature of security observations would be 
noted for future reference. 
Both Andrew and Billy cleared the security checks without any security defect and had 
their RI increased like all other passengers at the end of the phase, though an observation 
was made on Billy’s possession of a large quantity of sharp office materials. Charles who 
did not have any prior observation from the earlier phases cleared the security check also 
with an RI within the acceptable region. However, observation was made on his 
possession of screwdrivers and scissors. David had been stopped at the security checks 
for a brief clarification after pocketknives were found in his carry-on bag. The quick 
rectification of the detected security defect28 did not increase his RI though his RI went 
up at the end of the phase as a result of his progress toward the aircraft.  
 
 
                                                 
28 Defect rectified through the surrendering of the detected pocketknives. 
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(4) Concourse and Departure Gates: As the goods flow through 
this last phase of the supply chain, tests and checks continue to be conducted on the 
suspected goods that have yet to be verified as defect free or within the acceptable risk 
index. Dynamic Type 1 tests would continue to be conducted on these suspicious goods 
until the RI reaches an acceptable risk index level, exceeds the defect threshold that 
would result in an arrest or when boarding commences, whichever occurs first. At the 
same time, goods would also continue to be monitored and tracked for behavior or 
activities that could affect RI. Exhibited behavior could be mapped against earlier 
exhibited behavior for consistency matching. Any significant deviation from the earlier 
exhibited behaviors or any variation from behaviors exhibited by passengers bound for 
the same flight29 at the gate area could result in a further increase of RI. Consistency in 
behavior against earlier behaviors and behaviors of passengers bound for same flight 
would maintain the same RI level. RI could be reduced if the observed activities are 
conclusive that the goods are defect free. An example would be the voluntary check-in of 
all carry-on bags by a suspected individual who now no longer has access to his carry-on 
bags.  
c. Analysis of Risk Index 
An example of the risk index profile plot for the respective passengers as 
they progress through the various phases toward the aircraft is shown in Figure 14. 
                                                 
29 Behaviors of passengers from the same flight could be further categorized into same gender 
passengers who have similar profiles in terms of age, marital status, etc. 
 55 
 
Figure 14.  Passenger Risk Index Profile.30 
The initial phases of the supply chain flow would focus on identifying 
goods suspected of being potentially defective. Once a particular good is suspected to be 
defective, it would undergo a series of Type 1 tests to verify the presence of defects. 
Besides the Type 1 test, a Type 2 test would also be conducted to identify new or known 
defects. Depending on the outcome of the tests and checks, this entire process could well 
stretch over the different phases until boarding with a lowered RI or a breached RI (one 
that had exceeded the RI defect threshold). 
None of the tracked individuals’ RI has breached the defect threshold 
though Andrew and Billy had RIs above the acceptable region. These two passengers 
have a higher risk index profile than the normal passenger. However, on its own, the RI 
within the medium risk sector may not be a concern. In a similar fashion, two similar 
tests conducted separately may seem not to have any intrinsic meaning. However, the co-
relation of RIs with their associated events could actually point to some useful 
information, especially when tests results are correlated with an earlier observed activity 
that required further scrutiny. In this instance, tracing the monitored activities, behaviors 
and observations of the individual passenger the moment he enters the boundaries of the 
airport system and then mapping them alongside each other for analysis and comparison 
to identify commonalities or differences provides insights to the observed situation.  
                                                 
30 Gaps have been intentionally created in the risk index profile to delineate the respective passenger’s 
risk profile plot across the different phases. 
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The Type 1 tests31 administered separately on Andrew and Billy at 
different locations and test stations have linked them together based on what had 
happened earlier on board the train when Andrew took Billy’s check-in bag. This 
observation was a result of the interaction of information between the test system and the 
monitoring system and the ability to synthesize both pieces of information to produce the 
conclusion of suspected defect. It would appear that there was something unusual about 
the four passengers. From the observed activities and interactions (Andrew linking up 
with Charles at the concourse, Andrew picking up Billy’s check-in bag, Charles seated 
beside Billy) they appeared to be linked and to know each other though this is not 
explicitly displayed or shown. David likewise has a common link with Billy and Charles 
in the form of less common observations noted during security screening checks in terms 
of possession of sharp objects.32.  
These connections and linkages of observed activities and behaviors, 
coupled with the details of security screening of the corresponding check-in bags and 
other associated information33 available to the airport security system, provided a 
systems perspective in the analysis of the collective risk index profile associated with all 
passengers on board the same flight. This collective picture for a particular flight 
provided a basis for the decision on the type of security measures or safeguards that could 
be implemented in preparation for any uncertainties onboard the aircraft subsequently. In 
this instance, the collective risk index for the flight has exceeded the individual risk 
index, entering the medium-high risk sector, given the dubious relationships amongst the 
four passengers and the pattern that they collectively exhibit (in the form of bringing 
unusual sharp objects on board the flight). The fact that it was inconclusive to dismiss the 
presence of suspected defect(s) in the passengers further prompted the need for additional 
safeguards on board the flight. 
                                                 
31 These are questions on packing of check-in bag and if the bag had ever left the individual’s 
possession.  
32 Sharp objects such as knitting needles and screwdrivers could be used as a weapon on people 
(“Scotland’s courts seize thousands of knives,” 2011) (Shupe, 2013; Kaplan, 1993). 
33 Refers to information that serves as inputs into the airport system. For example, information on the 
manner in which the flight tickets were booked (tickets booked together, bought using the same credit card, 
etc.) 
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d. Application of Real-time Monitoring and Tracking of Risk Index 
Profile 
According to Fernandez and Jones (2013), a disgruntled man was hurt 
after detonating a home-made explosive in the Beijing airport on 20 July 2013. As 
reported by FlorCruz (2013), the wheelchair-bound man was stopped by airport security 
when he began distributing leaflets to publicize his cause. “Shortly after his standoff with 
airport security, the disgruntled petitioner detonated his devices” (FlorCruz, 2013). 
Airport security had seen the wheelchair-bound man distributing pamphlets earlier and 
stopped him without further actions. While the wheelchair-bound man was not a 
passenger scheduled for any flight, the concept of risk index would probably have made a 
difference in this case. Had the man’s movements within the airport boundaries been 
tracked with his risk index being profiled and monitored, there could been tell-tale signs 
that would have possibly flagged him for earlier security intervention. 
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VI. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. CONCLUSION 
A systems perspective was taken to investigate the airport passenger security 
system with the intention of identifying new perspectives on security and ways to 
enhance aviation security. In the analysis of the airport passenger security system, a 
supply chain approach was adopted to detect defects in passenger for security. Passengers 
were viewed as goods moving along the supply chain with each phase being a means to 
check for security conformance, to be defect-free and ready for boarding. The supply 
chain approach coupled with the methodological analysis of interactions between airport 
objects and passengers (as objects) as the later flow toward the aircraft provided insights 
and new perspectives on the passenger security system. Through this process, new 
security measures and processes were identified.  
Numerous data acquisition opportunities exist within the supply chain to allow 
security to assess and profile individual passengers. Based on the possible use of hyper-
spectral analysis of passenger shoe to identify materials and compositions underneath 
shoes, security authorities could have a clearer picture of the possible places the 
individual could have been to or particular activity that he could be involved with prior to 
the travel to the airport. The analysis of the interactions between the X-ray system and the 
passenger revealed a trade space between the elements of the X-ray technology, the 
competency of X-ray operator, the rate at which trays flow through the system, and the 
processes governing the screening of carry-on and belongings. While there are means to 
optimize this trade space for a more efficient throughput of passenger during screening, 
the elements are fundamentally dependent on the defined rule set for security screening.  
The current security concept of batch screening of passengers through a 
centralized passenger security screening model could be further improved. Correlation 
between passengers and their scheduled flights and between passengers on the same 
flight could be achieved through decentralized screenings at the respective departure 
gates or groups of departure gates. This decentralized security screening model would 
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provide a more refined baseline in terms of behavioral traits and activities of a common 
group of passengers bound for the same aircraft, thereby increasing the granularity of the 
security assessment. Compared to a centralized security screening model, the 
decentralized security screening at departure gates also minimized the set space for any 
possible change of passenger status to defective.  
The existing surveillance capabilities within and around the airport boundaries 
could be used to piece together a real-time profile of every passenger based on the pattern 
of behavior, interactions and activities undertaken across the different phases toward the 
aircraft. Coupled with the concept of RI profiling of every passenger, this monitoring and 
tracking of individual profiles and status could improve the probability of identifying 
potentially defective passengers before they board any aircraft. 
While improvements to the identified security measures and processes could 
enhance aviation security, the airport passenger security system can only be as effective 
as the individuals operating and running these processes, as human beings remain a 
vulnerable inside link that is susceptible to exploitation by terrorists. 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
In the interest of similar area of studies, future research could consider expanding 
the scope of analysis beyond the airport passenger security system to involve other 
objects within the airport that have interactions with the aircraft or with any other objects. 
These other objects may include passengers and flight crew onboard the aircraft.  
Arising from the thesis research, the existing airport infrastructure was identified 
as one of the key limitations of the current system. This was an inherent limitation given 
that the post 9/11 security measures were “quickly” incorporated into existing airports at 
that time, working around constraints posed by the airport infrastructure. Trade-offs were 
made within the system, maximizing one aspect while using the remaining variables to 
trade-off security. From a cost-effectiveness perspective, aviation travel was “secured” 
without regard for cost within a short timeframe after 9/11. While the cost-effectiveness 
of the airport security system has improved over time, as depicted in Figure 15, it has a 
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fixed baseline, possibly constrained by the inherent infrastructure, something that can be 
resolved if the limitation was changed.  
 
Figure 15.  Cost-effectiveness of Airport. 
A hypothetical model for the airport passenger security system of the future was 
envisaged (without the fundamental infrastructure as a constraint), and this model can be 
further researched subsequently. The hypothetical model for airport passenger security 
system of the future is shown in Figure 16. 
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Figure 16.  Hypothetical Model for Airport Passenger Security System of the Future. 
This model shows the relationship between the passenger and the deployed 
security technology and process. Figure 16 is a plot of loss (in terms of cost) versus 
performance (in terms of throughput or otherwise known as security efficiency in the 
form of feet moved per second) of passengers through the airport passenger security 
system. From the passenger perspective, an increase in throughput with a faster rate of 
movement across the airport domain, clearing security in a shorter period of time would 
come at a higher loss (i.e., more costly) to the individual. Conversely, a slower 
throughput would correspondingly lower the cost incurred by each individual. In the 
deployment of advanced security technologies and improved security processes, security 
authorities strive toward improving security efficiency with a lower cost (i.e., improved 
security would lower the loss associated with the loss of life, damage to aircraft and 
infrastructure, and economical loss resulting from terrorist(s) hijacking an aircraft). At 
the end toward zero throughput, the loss to security is infinite (as security technologies 
and processes are inadequate to detect and identify terrorists boarding aircrafts) as the 
passengers never make it to their destination. 
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The intersection of both the passenger and the security technology and process 
curve as shown at Point A reflects the current state of security technologies and 
processes, and the corresponding level of loss that is “acceptable,” the corresponding cost 
of security to the passenger and the resulting rate of flow through the airport. 
The aim is to move down the security technology and process curve to reduce loss 
resulting from the hijacking of aircraft while maintaining or lower the cost of security to 
each passenger. This can be achieved through improving the “gradient” of the passenger 
curve, shifting point A toward point B as shown in Figure 17.  
 
Figure 17.  Long Term Model Improvement. 
Further research could look into areas that could facilitate this movement along 
the security curve to achieve greater throughput at a lower cost. For example, the 
concurrent approach of being security screened while moving through airport toward the 
aircraft as compared to the existing sequential approach through the different phases at 
the airport domain. Through the deployment of advanced security technology and 
changes in security processes (paradigm shift from the existing way in which airports are 
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being built and operate), the passenger upon entering the physical boundary, could 
possibly be transported to the doorsteps of the aircraft and get security screened 
concurrently while onboard. There will be scope for analysis within this identified trade 
space and work toward the eventual end state of maximum throughput and lowered 
security loss. This increased efficiency will eliminate the need to be at the airport well in 
advance of scheduled departure to accommodate the different phases, including security 
screening. Instead, travelers will need only to allow sufficient time for the transportation 
and movement from the physical boundary of the airport to the doorsteps of the aircraft 
with security screening being performed concurrently.  
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